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Security: Admin DAPI unauthenticated — GET /admin/v1/config leaks worker_private key #1471

Closed @Aphelios01-sdk opened 2026-07-18 03:05 UTC 1 comment Updated 2026-07-18 03:07 UTC

Summary

The decentralized-api admin server (/admin/v1/*) registers routes with only logging middleware — no authentication.
GET /admin/v1/config returns the unsanitized live config as JSON, including ml_node_key_config.worker_private.

Other unauthenticated endpoints include POST /admin/v1/tx/send, claim recovery, bridge block inject, node enable/disable.

Affected components

Path Role
decentralized-api/internal/server/admin/server.go Routes + getConfig
decentralized-api/apiconfig/config.go WorkerPrivateKey json:"worker_private"
decentralized-api/main.go Listens :%port (all interfaces)
deploy/join/docker-compose.yml Maps 127.0.0.1:9200:9200 (mitigation only at compose layer)

Source

// getConfig returns the current configuration as JSON (unsanitized)
func (s *Server) getConfig(c echo.Context) error {
    cfg := s.configManager.GetConfig()
    return c.JSONPretty(200, cfg, "  ")
}

type MLNodeKeyConfig struct {
    WorkerPublicKey  string `json:"worker_public"`
    WorkerPrivateKey string `json:"worker_private"` // leaked via JSON
}

Note: KeyringPassword correctly uses json:"-"; worker private key does not.

Reproduce (if admin port reachable)

curl -sS "http://HOST:9200/admin/v1/config" | jq '.ml_node_key_config'
# No Authorization header required

Impact

If admin port is exposed (misconfigured publish / proxy / SG):

  • Theft of worker private key
  • Abuse of tx/send to broadcast host-signed txs
  • Operational control of nodes / bridge / claim recovery

Default compose binds loopback only, but the app does not fail-closed to localhost.

Suggested remediation

  1. Require auth on all /admin/v1/* (mTLS, bearer, or Unix socket only)
  2. Sanitize secrets from any config export API
  3. Bind admin to 127.0.0.1 in application code
  4. Message-type allowlist + auth on tx/send

Disclosure

No production hosts attacked. Happy to move this to HackerOne if preferred over public issues.

💬 Comments (1)

@Aphelios01-sdk commented 2026-07-18 03:07 UTC

Closing to focus disclosure on the highest-priority finding: https://github.com/gonka-ai/gonka/issues/1470 (SSRF via InferenceUrl). Other items can be re-opened or filed via HackerOne if needed.

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